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1 Introduction
It is becoming increasingly seen that for
exploring causality in many real-world
intervention settings, alternatives to the
traditional counterfactual approaches need to be
used, such as discussed in Stern et al. (2012) and
Mayne and Stern (2013). Among the reasons for
this are that many evaluations are conducted
after the intervention is in place; ethical
considerations limit the use of random
assignment; interventions may be aimed at the
entire population; or, with the increasing
complexity of many interventions, setting up
counterfactuals is not possible or practical.
Contribution analysis (Mayne 2012b, 2008,
2001) and process tracing (Beach and Pedersen
2011; Collier 2011; Bennett 2010, 2008) both
seek to make causal inferences about cause and
effect using non-counterfactual approaches
based on similar analysis tools: causal
mechanisms and theories of change.
Contribution analysis (CA) comes out of the
field of evaluation, while process tracing (PT)
has emerged from the analysis of historical
events. This article explores the relationship
between the two methodology approaches and,
using a hypothetical evaluation of a
development intervention addressing girls’
education, suggests a way to combine them. In
particular, it explores using PT from an
evaluation perspective, looks at how PT could be
used to strengthen a CA, and identifies a
combined CA-PT procedure for determining the
contribution made to outcomes. 
The identified procedure is not aimed at
‘measuring impact’ as such but rather at
‘increasing our confidence’ that the intervention
had an impact. It illustrates the practical steps
and consequences of grounding our thinking on
Bayesian probability, which – compared to
frequentist probability and statistics – offers
more flexibility in terms of combining
information from a variety of sources.
We first provide short overviews of perspectives
on causality, contribution analysis and process
tracing, before discussing the example and its
evaluation from a combined perspective. We
conclude that a CA framework is a useful entry
point for the application of PT to impact
evaluation, and that the application of PT
principles and tests strengthens the conclusions
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reached in CA by linking the CA process more
directly with an established method. 
1.1 Perspectives on causality
While it is common to adopt a counterfactual
view on causality (Gertler et al. 2011; HM
Treasury 2011; Leeuw and Vaessen 2009; Duflo,
Glennerster and Kremer 2008), as discussed by
Befani (2012) in Stern et al. (2012), and later by
Mayne (2012b), there are other approaches to
considering causality, in particular regularity
approaches, configurational approaches and
generative approaches (see Table 1). 
Counterfactual analysis is often used to
‘associate’ or attribute a cause to a given effect,
but it does not explain how the effect came
about. It merely recognises the existence of the
causal linkage, without describing its ‘inner
workings’ (or without ‘opening the black box’).
Other approaches based on ‘regularity’ are also
limited to associating cause and effect, although
– rather than using counterfactual logic – they
are based on the frequency of association. Their
main weakness is temporal precedence: even
when proving a strong association between two
factors, it might remain unclear which factor is
the cause and which factor is the effect (Brady
2002). More generally, approaches aimed at
mere association of cause and effect analyse the
relation between one single cause and one single
effect at a time (Mill 1843), which in a world of
complex interventions aimed at achieving
complex outcomes is often inadequate. 
Causal analysis can also aim to describe a causal
linkage in depth, describing how the effect was
produced. An effect is sometimes produced by a
complex combination of causes and the point of
research is then understanding what these
causes are, what their role in the combination
(or causal ‘package’) is, and eventually gaining
insight on how these factors are combined in the
causal mechanism (Glennan 1996).
Configurational approaches attempt a first,
parsimonious description of the ‘ingredients’ of
the causal mechanism, by identifying
configurations of conditions (as opposed to single
independent causes) that are associated with the
outcome (in the form of conjunctions and
disjunctions, aka logical intersections and
unions) (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Ragin 1989).
However, they do not go as far as generative
approaches in describing the fine-grained
characteristics of the causal mechanism. 
In evaluation, the most famous application of
generative causation is realist evaluation (RE)
(Pawson 2013, 2006; Pawson and Tilley 1997).
The basic analytical unit of RE is the Context-
Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) configuration,
which explains an outcome by way of how an
individual’s (or group’s) thinking, acting or
decision-making is influenced by contextual
resources (e.g. provided by a programme), which
can be socioeconomical, human capital, legal
frameworks, cultural, etc. In realist evaluation,
the mechanism explains how a given resource
led to behavioural change. In other theory-based
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Table 1 Four frameworks for causal inference
Aspect of causal Causal question Mill’s methods Description of causal 
relation mechanism
Counterfactual Association between Did the intervention Difference None
single cause and cause the effect? How 
Regularity single effect much is the net effect Agreement, None
of the intervention? concomitant variation
Configurational Association between What configurations of Agreement and Only the basic
configurations of factors are necessary difference but only ingredients are 
conditions and and/or sufficient for the applied to causal described: conditions, 
effects; description effect? packages their combinations and 
of causal mechanism disjunctions
Generative Description of causal How was the effect None In-depth
mechanism produced? How did it 
come about?
Source Adapted from Stern et al. (2012).
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approaches (including CA, see Section 1.1.1) a
more generic theory of change (not necessarily in
CMO form) is used to explain a sequence of
causal steps leading from the intervention
activities to the behavioural change of the
stakeholders, and eventually to the intended
outcome (Weiss 1997a, 1997b, 1995). 
1.1.1 Generative causality in contribution analysis
In evaluation, theories of change (ToC) are used
to model how an intervention is expected to
bring or has brought about intended changes
(Weiss 1997a, 1997b, 1995). These are models of
generative causality, showing the steps that occur
between some deliberate actions of an
intervention and subsequent observed changes,
and the assumptions needed for the steps to
occur. Figure 1 illustrates a basic ToC for an
intervention, showing generic steps between the
actions of the intervention and the subsequent
changes, along with the assumptions for each
causal link and associated risks. The assumptions
are the events and conditions that need to occur,
according to the ToC, if the causal link is to be
realised. Risks are the inverse of assumptions; if
they occur the link does not hold. Also noted are
other influencing factors,1 events and conditions
that could or might have influenced the causal
link in question positively or negatively, other
than the assumptions and risks. While appearing
linear, the ToC allows for numerous possible
feedback loops.
For most interventions of interest to work, a
number of actions, events and/or conditions in
addition to those of the intervention are needed
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Figure 1 Basic generic intervention ToC 
Source Authors’ own.
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– the supporting factors or assumptions in a ToC.
That is, the intervention is unlikely to be the sole
cause of a subsequent change, rather it is a
contributory cause. What is expected is that the
‘causal package’ of efforts by the intervention
plus other supporting factors together will be
sufficient to bring about a desired change (or at
least likely sufficient). And further, it is expected
that the actions of the intervention are an
essential part of the causal package, in which
case the intervention can claim to have made a
difference – not by itself, but within the causal
package2 – and as such is making a causal claim
(Mayne 2012a).  
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of
contributory causes which are neither necessary
nor sufficient to bring about an outcome (see
Befani 2013 and Mackie 1974 for a discussion of
INUS (Insufficient but Necessary part of an
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Box 1 Key steps in contribution analysis 
Step 1 Set out the cause–effect issue to be addressed
z Acknowledge the causal problem for the intervention in question
z Scope the problem: determine the specific causal question being addressed; determine
the level of confidence needed in answering the question 
z Explore the nature and extent of the contribution expected from the intervention
z Determine the other key factors that might influence the realisation of the results
z Assess the plausibility of the expected contribution given the intervention size and reach. 
Step 2 Develop the postulated ToC and risks to it, including other influencing factors 
z From intervention documents, interviews and relevant prior research, develop the
postulated ToC of the intervention, including identifying the assumptions and risks for
the causal links in the ToC
z Identify the roles other key influencing factors may play in the ToC
z Determine how contested the postulated ToC  is to better understand the strength of
evidence needed.
Step 3 Gather the existing evidence on the ToC 
z Gather the evidence that exists from previous measurement, past evaluations and
relevant research to assess the likelihood: (1) of the expected results, assumptions and
risk being realised; (2) of each of the causal links in the results chain occurring; and
(3) of the other influencing factors making a significant difference. 
Step 4 Assemble and assess the contribution claim, and challenges to it 
z Set out the contribution ‘story’ on the likelihood that the intervention ‘worked’: the
causal claim based on the analysis of logic and evidence so far 
z Assess the strengths and weaknesses in the postulated ToC in light of the available
evidence, and the relevance of the other influencing factors – which links seem
reasonable and which look weak and need more evidence
z If needed, refine or update the ToC. 
Step 5 Gather new evidence from the implementation of the intervention
z With a focus on the identified weaknesses, gather data on the ToC results that occurred,
the assumptions and risks associated with the causal links and the other identified
influencing factors.
Step 6 Revise and strengthen the contribution story 
z Build a more credible contribution claim based on the new data gathered
z Reassess its strengths and weaknesses, i.e. the extent to which the results, assumptions/
risks and other influencing factors occurred 
z Conclude on the strength of the ToC and the role played by other influencing factors,
and hence on the contribution claim
z If the evidence is still weak, revisit Step 5.
Source Adapted from Mayne (2012b, 2011).
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Unnecessary but Sufficient conjunction) and
SUIN (Sufficient but Unnecessary part of an
Insufficient but Necessary disjunction) causality).
However, the above distinction between different
causal frameworks helps set the stage for our
discussion, and to some extent comparison, of CA
and PT. The type of causality we are talking about
in both CA and PT is in fact multiple (multiple
factors can be responsible for the outcome) and
conjunctural (factors combine in complex ways to
produce outcomes), so that it is impossible to
draw an inference between one single factor and
an outcome. It is causal packages and
configurations of factors that produce outcomes. 
1.2 Contribution analysis
CA (Mayne 2012b, 2011) is based on a ToC for
the intervention being examined in detail.
Depending on the situation, the ToC may be
based on the expectations of the funders, the
understandings of those managing the
intervention, the experiences of the beneficiaries
and/or prior research and evaluation findings.
The ToC may be developed during planning for
the intervention – the ideal approach – and then
revised as implementation occurs, or be built
retrospectively at the time of an evaluation.
Good practice is to make use of prior research on
similar interventions as much as possible. The
analysis undertaken examines and tests the ToC
against logic, the data available from results
observed and the various assumptions behind the
ToC, and examines other influencing factors.
The analysis either confirms the postulated ToC
or suggests revisions to it where the reality
appears otherwise. The overall aim is to reduce
uncertainty about the contribution an
intervention is making to observed results
through an increased understanding of why
results did or did not occur, and the roles played
by the intervention and other influencing factors.
Six key steps in undertaking a CA are set out in
Box 1, adapted and expanded from Mayne
(2012b, 2011). These steps are often part of an
iterative approach to building the argument for
claiming that the intervention made a
contribution and exploring why or why not.
CA argues that if one can verify or confirm a ToC
with empirical evidence – that is, verify that the
steps and assumptions in the intervention ToC
were realised in practice, and account for other
major influencing factors – then it is reasonable
to conclude that the intervention in question has
made a difference, i.e. was a contributory cause
for the outcome. The ToC provides the
framework for the argument that the
intervention is making a difference, and the
analysis identifies weaknesses in the argument
and hence where evidence for strengthening
such claims is most needed. 
Causality is inferred from the conditions and
evidence outlined in Box 2.
In the end, conclusions are reached – a
contribution claim about whether the intervention
made a difference, and on how the results were
realised. 
What does a contribution claim look like? The
result of a CA is rarely definitive proof. Causality
in relation to socioeconomic interventions is
usually of the probabilistic form: that the
intervention is most likely to have made a
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Box 2 Conditions needed to infer causality in CA
1 Plausibility. The intervention is based on a reasoned ToC: the chain of results and the
assumptions behind why the intervention is expected to work are plausible, sound,
informed by existing research and literature, and supported by key stakeholders.
2 Fidelity. The activities of the intervention were implemented as outlined in the ToC.
3 A verified ToC. The ToC is verified by evidence: the chain of expected results occurred, and
the causal assumptions held.
4 Accounting for other influencing factors. Context and other factors influencing the
intervention are assessed and are either shown not to have made a significant contribution
or, if they did, their relative contribution is recognised and included in the ToC, as part of a
larger causal package that the ToC captures as faithfully as possible.
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difference. However, unlike statistical approaches
based on large samples, CA builds on different
sources of evidence to make an argument from
which it is reasonable to conclude with confidence
that the intervention has made a contribution,
explaining why it did. It builds a compelling case
– a warrant – about the contribution being made.
1.3 Process tracing
Process tracing (PT) is a method for within-case
analysis3 that was originally formalised by
Bennett (Bennett 2010; George and Bennett
2005), further developed by Collier (2011) and
eventually advanced into a textbook by Beach
and Pedersen (2012). In PT, a causal mechanism
that is believed to explain the outcome is
theorised in the form of a number of interlocked
components that are all necessary for the causal
mechanism to exist (Beach and Pedersen 2012).4
These components represent entities (for
example, actors and institutions) that engage in
some kind of activity or display a particular
behaviour; these (necessary) components can be
seen as a sequence of linked intermediate effects
that explain how actions have led to certain
outcomes. In both CA and PT approaches, the
aim is to look for evidence that increases our
confidence in the existence or non-existence of
the causal mechanism or the ToC, by increasing
our confidence in the existence of its component
parts. Below are some general characteristics
and principles of PT, which in some cases we will
compare with CA.
Firstly, the basic empirical units in PT are so-
called ‘causal process observations’ (CPOs),
which differ from ‘data set observations’ (DSOs)
mostly used in quantitative analysis (Collier,
Brady and Seawright 2010). Applying PT usually
entails observing a causal process that has
occurred over time and CPOs are accounts of
these observations, while DSOs are matrices
displaying the characteristics (variable values) of
a sample of cases at a given time. This is in line
with analysing a ToC in CA, where causal steps
follow a temporal sequence, even though the
latter might not be linear and there might be
causal loops at work between steps. 
In PT, observations5 are not strong or weak
evidence per se; for example, observing one step
of a process in isolation is usually not very
informative. It becomes so or not, depending on
what other observations have been made in
previous steps of the process or in other parallel
processes. In other words, ‘evidence’ is a
combination of observations and other
contextual factors such as previous knowledge,
timing, the way in which the facts emerge, and so
on. PT evidence always results from some
combination or accumulation of empirical
observations and other contextual information;
it follows that the same observation made in
different contexts can have very different levels
of inferential leverage. This is intuitive if we
think about how evidence is dealt with in law
courts: it is combined with the circumstances of
discovery, the crime, the suspect’s motives and
past history, and so on. 
A general difference with statistical methods is
that, in PT, the ability of single observations to
act as evidence, evaluated in a context-sensitive
manner, is much more important than the
number of pieces of evidence collected (Bennett
2008).6 The quantity of observations can affect
the strength of evidence if they are independent,
but the basic principle underlying the quality of
evidence is not sample size, but rather the
probability of observing given pieces of data.
These probabilities can be general, like the
average probability of observing a given piece of
evidence P(E), or conditional, like the
probabilities: 
z of observing that same piece of evidence
under the assumption that the causal
mechanism holds, or P(E|CM) 
z of observing that same piece of evidence
under the alternative assumption that the
causal mechanism does not hold, or
P(E|~CM). 
If observations made seem to confirm the causal
mechanism, some questions to ask are: ‘Do these
observations support other causal mechanisms?
Could these observations have been made if the
change was being caused by other causal
mechanisms? If so, how likely would these
observations have been? Do these observations
seem to be unique to this causal mechanism?’. 
Other important probabilities in process tracing
are: (a) the prior probability of the causal
mechanism being triggered, P(CM), which
expresses our confidence that the mechanism
holds, on the basis of previous knowledge from
different sources and prior to conducting data
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collection (related to the principle of plausibility
in CA); and (b) the probability that the causal
mechanism holds after data collection, when a
given piece of evidence has been observed,
P(CM|E). The latter is what we try to maximise
through data collection: we aim to design data
collection so as to maximise its power to change
our prior, ‘theoretical’ confidence. If P(CM|E) is
similar to P(CM) it means that our evidence is
weak: the bigger the difference between the two
probabilities, the stronger evidence E is. 
As researchers we often use these probabilities
unknowingly, almost unconsciously: for example,
we know that the presence of vested interests in
the success of a particular project will make
judgement about that project by an individual
with such interests biased/unreliable; his/her
positive judgement will be weak evidence that
the project was actually successful. In formulas,
this is because the prior probability of that
individual evaluating the project positively
[P(E)] is in any case (at the start, independently
of how the project actually goes) high. It is true
that, if the project is successful, s/he would have
likely given a positive judgement [P(E|CM) is
high]; but because s/he has stakes in the project
and other incentives, she might give the same
judgement also for other reasons, if the project is
not successful [P(E|~CM) is also high].7 The
difference between these two probabilities is low,
hence the weakness of evidence, E.
Bayes’ theorem shows us why P(E) being high is
not good for the quality of evidence. The Bayes
formula indicates how our initial confidence
P(CM) about a causal mechanism, CM, is
changed by the evidence collected (E), becoming
P(CM|E). It can be illustrated in two different
but equivalent ways. The first: 
P(CM|E) = P(CM)*P(E|CM)/P(E)
shows that an observation, E,8 strengthens our
initial confidence in the causal mechanism
[which is represented by P(CM)] if the prior
probability of the observation P(E) is low, because
P(E) stands in the denominator of the ratio by
which P(CM) is multiplied. In particular, our
confidence is strengthened by the observation E if
its probability under the theory of change
P(E|CM) is higher than its general, ‘average’,
probability P(E).9 We can also see that the higher
the difference between the expectation of the
evidence under the theory holding P(E|CM) and
the general expectation of the evidence P(E) the
more our post-observation confidence in the
theory of change P(CM|E) is strengthened.10
The second formula illustrating Bayes’ theorem11
shows that an observation E increases our initial
confidence in the causal mechanism P(CM) if
the probability of making that observation if CM
is realised [P(E|CM)] is greater than the
probability of making it if CM is not realised (i.e.
under alternative assumptions) P(E|~CM).12
1.3.1 Using evidence in PT 
The Bayes formula as illustrated above implies
that we use evidence in order to increase or
decrease our confidence P(CM) in the existence
of a causal mechanism, CM, and provides criteria
to judge the power that evidence has to change
our pre-observation confidence. We summarise
these criteria in Box 3, while we address their
practical implications later.
The above criteria are related to probabilities
and, therefore, to some extent are quantitative.
Luckily PT also provides qualitative criteria to
judge the quality of evidence: certainty and
uniqueness. Usually we cannot be absolutely
certain that a causal mechanism holds; however,
we can be certain that some mechanisms do not
hold. Certainty thus refers to the ability that
some tests have to rule out causal hypotheses, in
other words it refers to the disconfirmatory
power of tests. These are called hoop tests
because the causal candidate needs to ‘pass
through the hoop’ if it is to be retained as a
possible cause (Beach and Pedersen 2012; Collier
2011; Bennett 2010; Van Evera 1997).
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Box 3 Criteria to assess the strength of evidence in Bayesian analysis
The strength of evidence E for a causal mechanism CM is proportional to the distance
between the probability of E under the causal mechanism [P(E|CM)] and the average
probability of evidence E [P(E)], and to the distance between the probability of E under
the causal mechanism [P(E|CM)], and the probability of E under all alternatives to the
causal mechanism P(E|~CM).
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Uniqueness is less strong as it refers to the
confirmatory power of tests. Unique tests (called
smoking gun tests) can confirm that a causal
mechanism is indeed at work on the basis of the
‘signature’ traces it leaves (which are deemed to
be unique to that mechanism and practically
impossible to have been left by other
mechanisms). If a unique test confirms the
presence of a mechanism, this does not
necessarily mean that the outcome was
exclusively produced by that mechanism: it
might just mean that the latter has a causal role,
that it is a contributory cause. Causality is often
multiple and smoking gun tests might not
provide information on other mechanisms that
might be at work in parallel to the one we are
confirming. They might just confirm that a
particular mechanism has a role. We will see in
Section 1.3.2 that there are different types of
unique tests, and not all of them compare
mutually-exclusive hypotheses (Rohlfing 2013).
The typology of PT tests includes two additional
types: the straw-in-the-wind and the doubly-
decisive. We will not address the former as it is
neither confirmatory nor disconfirmatory,13 while
the latter is both, being simultaneously
characterised by certainty and uniqueness, and
being able to both confirm a causal mechanism
and reject all of its alternatives.
There is a link between the probabilistic
formulation addressed above and the qualitative
tests. The hoop or disconfirmatory test is a piece
of evidence that we expect to observe if the
causal mechanism holds: in other words the
probability of observing E under CM is high,
which means the numerator of the Bayes
formula P(E|CM) is high. The smoking gun or
confirmatory test, on the other hand, is a piece of
evidence that is unlikely under any alternative to
the causal mechanism [P(E|~CM) is low] and
thus its average probability P(E) is low, too. As
seen above, those quantities can be found in the
denominator of the Bayes formula showing how
our pre-observation confidence in the causal
mechanism P(CM) changes after data collection
[into P(CM|E)].
In practice, these tests guide the search for
evidence. Disconfirmatory tests prompt the
question ‘What do we expect to observe if the
causal mechanism is realised?’, while confirmatory
tests ask ‘What observations could only be made if
the causal mechanism holds, and could not be
made if it does not? What observations are unique
to the causal mechanism?’.
In other words, confirmatory evidence is an
observation or a set of observations that could
not have been made, or is extremely unlikely,
under alternatives to the causal mechanism,
while disconfirmatory evidence is an observation,
or a set of observations, that could not have been
made if the causal mechanism under test were
realised (see Table 2).14
1.3.2 The different implications of confirmatory
evidence
A specific piece of evidence might confirm a
causal mechanism, but other observations might
well support the parallel existence of others. So
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Table 2 Relation between types of observations, types of evidence, Van Evera’s tests and the Bayes formula
Description: an observation (or a set of Relation to Relation to the Bayes formula
observations) that is: Van Evera’s P(E|CM) P(E|~CM) 
tests and P(E)
Disconfirmatory Unlikely under the causal mechanism (CM) Fails hoop test Low –
evidence
Confirmatory Unlikely under any alternative to the causal Passes smoking – Low
evidence mechanism (~CM) gun test
Both Likely under the causal mechanism (CM); Doubly-decisive High Low 
unlikely under any alternative (~CM) test
Neither Likely under the causal mechanism (CM); Straw-in-the- High High
likely under alternatives (~CM) wind test
Source Authors’ own.
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confirming the CM does not automatically
invalidate other explanations, even though
sometimes it could. This means that not all
alternatives are ‘rival’ in the proper sense.
In an attempt to understand the differences
among confirmatory tests and their implications,
a typology of ten different types of confirmatory
tests, all having a working hypothesis and an
alternative, has been proposed (Rohlfing 2013).
These tests differ on the characteristics of the
cause and the effect. Namely, the two
alternatives being compared might have the
same cause and the same outcome, or mutually-
exclusive causes or outcomes, or non-mutually-
exclusive causes or outcomes. Two such tests are
of particular interest here. We introduce them
briefly below and then use them in the
application section.
The first type of confirmatory test attempts at
answering the question: ‘(On the basis of the
collected data) did the intervention (likely)
contribute to the outcome? Or did factor F likely
contribute?’. In symbols, the working assumption
is represented by I -> O, while the alternative by
F -> O.15 In this case confirming the causal
relevance of the intervention does not provide
any information on the relevance of the other
factor(s). If we want to learn about the latter, we
need to repeat the same test, using factor F as
the working assumption. This way we might
answer the question: Were there other
contributing factors, in addition to or in
combination with the intervention?   
The second type of test is applied to our
strongest hypothesis, usually a complex, ‘heavy’
ToC including several factors and mechanisms
that have been shown to have contributed to the
intervention separately. The question is: ‘Is this
ToC the only (most) plausible explanation for
the outcome?’. In symbols, the working
hypothesis is ToC -> O, while the alternative is
~ToC -> O. This is a doubly-decisive test
because, unlike the previous test, confirming the
ToC automatically invalidates any other causal
mechanism. We will use these tests in  Section 2,
where we apply some of the concepts introduced
so far (certainty, uniqueness and the various
probabilities) in examining the case of an
intervention providing training to teachers in an
attempt to increase the school performance of
girls. 
2 Carrying out contribution analysis applying
the tests and principles of process tracing
The case presented here is not a full, proper
application of the procedure, but rather an
attempt to imagine how PT can be applied to a
real-life evaluation that has been conducted in
the past using CA. It is not meant to represent
an ideal case for PT, but more like a ‘test case’
for a ‘proof-of-concept’ argument. It will perhaps
not provide operational guidelines, but it does
sketch the contours of a procedure, which we call
the CA-PT procedure, and which we hope
deepens the discussion on how PT and CA can be
combined to strengthen each other. 
One reason why we are trying to combine CA
with a method is that CA is an approach, and
does not spell out detailed steps to follow in data
collection or discusses explicitly the types and
strength of evidence used. Applying PT to a CA
can thus allow us to use the logic of CA as
overarching guidance, while at the same time
ask specific questions related to data collection,
such as: ‘What kind of evidence is (mostly)
necessary and/or (mostly) sufficient to
confirm/disconfirm a causal explanation?’. In
other words, PT provides CA with indications on
what evidence to look for and with criteria to
judge the strength of that evidence,
complementing the CA steps outlined in Box 1,
in particular steps five and six.
In this section we try to answer the PT question
both in relation to the whole ToC as a ‘heavy’
mechanism including and combining many
causal factors, and in relation to its single
steps/components, starting from the latter. We
will see that these two objects require two
different types of PT tests. 
We present a procedure to carry out the last two
steps of CA, inspired by PT, which is made of
three broad steps16 that we will call PT steps, and
which are tests of: 
1 the intervention main mechanism (PT1);
2 other causal mechanisms external to the
intervention (PT2);17 and
3 the comprehensive ToC including the
intervention and the external factors (PT3).
PT1 and PT2 entail carrying out hoop tests and
smoking gun tests for the causal mechanism
under analysis: the intervention main
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mechanism (PT1) and the other causal
mechanisms external to the intervention, to be
tested one by one (PT2). Finally, if the evaluator
feels confident enough that s/he has good
evidence on all relevant causal factors, s/he can
try to test the whole ToC in a doubly-decisive test
(PT3). Straw-in-the-wind tests are not
considered here as they neither confirm nor
disconfirm the hypothesis (see Table 3).
2.1 Setting up the case
We use a hypothetical example of an intervention
that has been in place for several years aimed at
improving girls’ education outcomes.
2.1.1 The problem, as seen at the time the intervention
started
In a region, education outcomes for girls are low.
Girls’ education is not seen as a priority;
attendance is low and drop-out rates are high.
Based on some interviews with students,
households and teachers, a likely key issue is that
many teachers themselves do not see girls’
education as important and do not have the skills
to provide a gender-sensitive approach to
education. Physical access to schools per se does
not appear to be a problem. Besides lack of
teacher preparation, other factors that likely
contribute to low educational outcomes are the
availability of work on the market for girls (in a
nearby garment factory), the expectation that it
is a priority for girls to help the older women
with household chores, discomfort felt by girls
with school accommodation, and the poor
availability of textbooks. The organisation
responsible for implementing the intervention
has limited resources and can only focus on
improving teacher preparation; however, during
the implementation of the programme, other
interventions attempt to tackle some of the other
issues.
2.1.2 The intervention
Based on this analysis, the intervention has been
set up to provide special gender-sensitive
training to teachers, stressing the importance of
education for girls. It provides training to
teachers to raise their awareness of the special
needs and situation of girls in school, and
addresses teachers’ attitudes towards education
for girls. It also provides them with ways and
means to adopt a more gender-sensitive
approach in classrooms, by ensuring that girls
are not discriminated in their opportunities to
learn. 
2.1.3 The overall ToC
The intervention is based on the idea that if
teachers provide a more supportive and gender-
sensitive teaching in the schools, then girls will be
more actively engaged in studying and wanting
an education, which will lead to better education
outcomes for girls (which can be measured, for
example, with test scores or graduation rates). 
2.1.4 Prior evidence for the intervention
The quality of teaching has been shown to be a
significant factor in better education outcomes
(OECD 2005). However, there is poor evidence
that sensitising teachers to the specific problems
faced by girls will result in better educational
outcomes for girls, partly because this type of
intervention has been rarely implemented (and
evaluated).
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Table 3 Relation between PT steps and PT test types 
PT test types
Disconfirmatory phase Confirmatory phase Doubly-decisive test 
(hoop test, maximising (smoking gun test, (both certainty and 
certainty) maximising uniqueness) uniqueness)
PT steps PT1: testing the Yes Yes No
intervention
PT2: testing other Yes Yes No
potentially contributing 
factors
PT3: testing the complex No No Yes
ToC as a whole
Source Authors’ own.
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2.1.5 Main evaluation findings
After two years, an evaluation is undertaken and
it is found that indeed education outcomes for
girls have improved: the average test scores are
higher. 
The main evaluation questions then would be:
z Can the improved outcomes be ‘claimed by’
the intervention? 
z How was the improved school performance of
girls brought about?
When we apply PT we assume that CA has been
completed up to and including step four, and that
data collection on the implementation is about to
start. We propose to show how the data collection
process to answer the above questions could be
designed using PT.
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Figure 2 ToC for enhancing education outcomes for girls
Source Authors’ own.
Girls’ learning improves with
better education outcomes
Girls more engaged in and
wanting an education
Awareness and skills training
provided to teachers on girls’
education needs
All relevant teachers get the
training
Capacity changes in teachers’
knowledge, attitudes and
skills
Teachers provide girls with
more empathetic and
supportive teaching
Girls’ direct benefit change assumptions and
risks (A4)
z Girls have time to absorb new content
z Schools can adequately accommodate
new teaching style
Other possible supporting factors
z Availability of factory work
External influences
Parents
Peers
Religion
Culture (media,
community campaigns)
Education resources
(textbooks, internet)
Girls’ behaviour change assumptions and
risks (A3)
z Girls are less interested in education
partly as a result of insensitive teaching
z Girls attend school
Teacher behaviour change assumptions and
risks (A2)
z Training relates to the local conditions
and has addressed attitudes
z Teachers are assessed in part on their
application of the training
Teacher capacity change assumptions and
risks (A1)
z Most teachers are amenable to helping
improve education for girls
Reach risks (R1)
z Only teachers with a predisposition to
the importance of girls’ education attend
Activities Results
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2.1.6 A ToC for the intervention
Contribution analysis starts with a ToC for the
intervention. Ideally this is one developed during
the planning stage of the intervention and
revised over time as more data and
understanding are acquired. If this was not done,
then a ToC is developed at the outset of the
evaluation and perhaps revised at the end.
Developing a ToC was briefly discussed earlier. 
A ToC for the intervention is shown in Figure 2.
The assumptions listed are events and conditions
necessary for the causal link in question to occur.
From the assumptions listed in the ToC (and
noted in setting out the problem) it is clear that
considerably more than teacher training is likely
needed to make an impact on the girls’
education. These other supporting factors such
as the ability to accommodate girls, a supportive
home environment, and teachers’ performance
being assessed in part on how they have applied
the training – to name only a few – along with
the teacher training provided comprise the
intervention ‘causal package’. It is expected that
over the course of the evaluation, the ToC will be
revised to better reflect the context of the
intervention and the causal factors at work.
Figure 2 lists some other possible influencing
factors. In the course of the evaluation, students,
teachers, parents, community leaders, school
administrators, etc. would be asked to identify
any changes that had occurred during the past
two years that they feel might have influenced
the good educational outcomes achieved and why
they think so. This would provide a rich source of
factors that might have had an influence.
2.2 The analysis
At this stage CA has been completed up to and
including step four,18 and data collection needs to be
designed and conducted in order to carry out step
five, and eventually step six (perhaps iteratively).
There are a number of plausible causal factors in
the ToC, and the PT-inspired procedure starts by
testing them. The first phase (called the
disconfirmatory or ruling out phase) is aimed at
ruling out some of these factors (including
possibly the contribution of the intervention)
relatively quickly, with the confirmation work to
be conducted later. This is the hoop test phase,
aimed at maximising certainty, because hoop
tests are used for disconfirming the hypotheses
about the relevance of the causal factors, and
lays out the foundation for PT1 and PT2 because
it is conducted on all causal factors considered,
including the intervention. 
2.2.1 Maximising certainty: ruling out possible causal
factors through hoop tests
This phase is about clarifying your ideas about
what you expect to observe if a given causal
factor contributed to the outcome and then
testing your expectations on reality. You can
measure the strength of your expectations with
the probability of making a given set of
observations if the causal mechanism for the
factor holds, which in symbols is P(E|CM) (it sits
at the numerator in the Bayes formula).
Consider two causal mechanisms:
Causal mechanism A (CMA): the training contributed to
increased school performance of girls. If the training
had an impact, the evaluator has at least two
expectations for the moment (we will call these
both EA for evidence of causal mechanism A):
(1) that the training has been provided to a
considerable number of teachers, and (2) that the
girls acknowledge the contribution of teachers by
providing a judgement of their performance
between neutral and positive. The latter is not
sufficient to claim impact, as it is thought that
girls would be afraid to say anything negative
about teachers, but it is thought of as necessary
because if there are widespread complaints about
teacher performance from the girls then it
becomes unlikely that outcomes improved because
of anything the teachers did. Similarly, the extent
of training provided is not sufficient to claim
impact but it is necessary as the outcomes are
widespread. In sum, failing to observe any of the
above two facts greatly reduces our confidence
that the intervention had an impact, and under
normal circumstances, eliminates the hypothesis,
shifting the evaluator’s attention to other factors.
This is because the probability of observing the
two EA factors under the assumption that causal
mechanism A holds is high [P(EA|CMA) is high].
With regard to Table 2, we would be in a situation
where the observations made (~EA) would be
unlikely under the hypothesis CMA, and the hoop
test fails (first row).
Causal mechanism B (CMB): the closing of the local
garment factory meant that girls were no longer sent to
work there and had more time to study, hence the
increase in educational outcomes. If this explanation
is valid, we would expect to observe: the closing
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of the local factory, evidence that it was
employing many girls, and that these girls have
actually been granted free time instead of being
employed elsewhere or in assisting with
household chores. We call this EB for evidence of
causal mechanism B: if the causal mechanism is
realised, the probability of observing EB is high
[P(EB|CMB) is high]. That is why failing to
observe EB greatly reduces our confidence in
causal mechanism B, to the point that we lose
interest in the explanation.
If all sets of potential observations EA and EB
are actually observed, both causal mechanisms
pass the respective hoop tests, which means they
remain causal candidates for the outcome.
Usually at this stage we still do not have strong
evidence that those causal mechanisms were
actually at work, which we look for in the next
phase. Conversely, say if EB is not observed
because no factory was closed, CMB fails the
hoop test and only CMA remains as a causal
candidate for the outcome. 
Similar arguments would be made for each
identified causal factor. The TOC could be then
revised, putting more emphasis on those causal
factors that survived the hoop test, and
downplaying the role of, or removing, those that
failed it. If the intervention mechanism fails the
hoop test, the evaluation task could potentially
end here, unless the evaluation questions are
changed to increase the focus on other factors.
2.2.2 Maximising uniqueness: verifying the detailed
steps of a sophisticated causal mechanism
In this phase the causal mechanisms that have
survived the hoop tests are administered
confirmatory or smoking gun tests, aimed at
finding unique evidence that practically confirms
or greatly increases our confidence in their
existence. Unique evidence for a causal
mechanism is a set of observations considered
(extremely) unlikely under any other causal
mechanism. This increases our confidence in the
hypothesis because unless that hypothesis was
confirmed, making that specific set of
observations would have been (extremely)
unlikely. In Bayesian terms, the probability of
making those observations P(E) is in general
(extremely) low, or at least (extremely) low
under alternatives to the causal mechanisms
P(E|~CM) (these probabilities sit at the
denominator in the Bayes formula).
Constructing confirmatory/smoking gun tests is
more complicated than constructing
disconfirmatory/hoop tests. In order to minimise
the probability of observing evidence that we
hope to be confirmatory, we need to formulate
the ToC in a way that is as unique, specific and
detailed as possible, with a high number of
clearly specified steps, a high level of detail on
the inner workings of the causal mechanism,
including resources; incentives; preferences;
thinking; actions and interactions of all the
stakeholders involved in the causal mechanism.
Building the mechanism as a concatenation of
several normally independent events will ensure
that the probability of observing the entire set of
events P(E) is minimised, following the
probability law assigning to the combination of
n events x1 * x2 * … xn the product of the
probabilities of the single events P(x1) * P(x2) *
… * P(xn). P(E) becomes increasingly lower (and
the strength of the evidence when E is observed
increasingly higher) as more and more
(independent) components are added to the
causal mechanism.
The extent to which this can practically be done
will vary by situation. Further, in cases such as we
are exploring where there are very likely to be
multiple causal factors at play, the uniqueness of
the effects of the activities of the intervention –
the training in our case – may only be apparent
for proximate effects (see Ton et al., this IDS
Bulletin). Further along the impact pathway,
other causal factors might explain the causal
mechanisms at work.
We start from wanting to confirm the causal
mechanism explaining the contribution of the
intervention, without intending to automatically
weaken other explanations. As we collect more
evidence on the relevance of several coexisting
causal factors or mechanisms (as suggested in
CA condition four, Box 2), we then become more
ambitious and build an increasingly complex ToC
interconnecting all the factors and mechanisms
shown to be relevant. At some point we might
feel confident enough to try a doubly-decisive test.
Table 4 shows the relation between the PT steps
as defined above, CA steps and CA conditions
(see Box 1 and Box 2). Steps one to four are not
addressed in detail here but they all collectively
contribute to our prior confidence that the
theory or its causal mechanisms hold P(CM). 
IDS Bulletin Volume 45  Number 6  November 2014 29
2 Befani IDSB45.6.qxd  16/10/2014  13:00  Page 29
2.2.2.1 Assessing the contribution of the intervention to
improvement of girls’ school performance (PT1)
Part of step one was carrying out the hoop test
on this causal mechanism, i.e. the intervention,
and if we are at this stage it means that the
hypothesis survived it. Another causal
mechanism also survived the disconfirmatory
phase: the one about the factory closing down. As
our knowledge about the relevant causal factors
at this stage is still relatively poor, we start from
a test where confirmation of one causal
mechanism does not automatically eliminate
others (i.e. where causal mechanisms are not
mutually-exclusive, Rohlfing 2013). The relevant
general question is the following:
Did the intervention contribute to the outcome
(i.e. the working hypothesis is I -> O)?
z In this test, confirming the causal relevance of
the intervention does not provide any
information on the relevance of other factors,
which will need separate testing using the
same uniqueness principle. So if the hypothesis
that the intervention contributed is confirmed,
this does not mean that the closing down of the
factory did not also contribute.
The key specific question here is: What
observations can only be made if the intervention
has indeed made a contribution? 
Identifying a unique set of observations is
extremely useful because, when made, they
practically prove impact. In order to identify this
unique set of observations that we wish to make,
we need a detailed and sophisticated version of
the causal mechanism explaining the contribution
of the intervention, and then – in line with the
third condition of contribution analysis – hope to
confirm/observe all of its components.
The sophisticated mechanism we are trying to
map out identifies a specific process linking what
the teachers were taught, with what they
implemented in their teaching practice, with the
girls’ behavioural change, and finally the
improved educational outcomes. Figure 2 shows
this impact pathway. These linkages might be
tested by answering the following evaluation
sub-questions:19
z Was the training well received by teachers?
z Was the teaching offered to girls improved
along the lines of the training that was
delivered?
z How likely would these improvements have
been without the training?
z Can girls relate in specific ways their
increased interest in learning to the teaching
they are now getting?
z Is the better teaching among the factors that
stakeholders (girls, parents, administrators,
community leaders) point to when explaining
the improved educational outcomes for girls,
particularly when prompted in a way that
reduces the probability of them mentioning
the teaching?
Answering the above questions means verifying
the existence of all the steps in the causal
mechanism relating the training to improved
performance. If positive answers are found to all
or most questions, the observed causal
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Table 4 Relation among PT tests and CA steps and conditions in the combined CA-PT procedure
CA conditions (Box 2) CA steps (Box 1)
PT steps PT0: building confidence on the 1 and 2 1, 2, 3 and 4
causal mechanism on the basis of 
previous knowledge pre-data 
collection
PT1: testing the intervention 3 5 and 6
PT2: testing other potentially 4 5 and 6
contributing factors
PT3: testing the complex ToC – 5 and 6
as a whole
Source Authors’ own.
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mechanism associated with the training
constitutes ‘smoking gun’ evidence that, at least
in part, the improvements in teaching are due to
the training, particularly if alternative
explanations for each step are unlikely, and the
causal mechanism describes what they are and
how they came about. This process is similar to
that carried out in a CA, but the PT approach
suggests a focus on tracing the specific effect of
the causal factor as far as possible along the
impact pathway.
The uniqueness of this test can be high because
once we observe all of this it becomes difficult to
think of another explanation (alternative to the
intervention) that could be responsible for
triggering all the steps in the causal mechanism.
We can think of alternative events being
responsible for each single step, but the chance of
all these alternative events materialising to
trigger the sequence instead of the intervention
being successful is low, because the events are
relatively independent. The training might not
have been appreciated at all by the teachers,
subsequent teaching in the classrooms might not
have reflected the training or teachers were
unable to implement the correspondent changes
in class, girls might have viewed the changed
teaching approaches as condescending or
superficial, or the improved teaching might have
been well received but not viewed as a relevant
factor in the better outcomes.  The chances of all
these events aligning at the same time, one step
after the other, are generally low [P(E) is low]. In
particular, they are low if the training did not have
an impact and these events are triggered by other
causal mechanisms unrelated to the intervention
[P(E|~CM) is low]. So the empirical
confirmation of all of these links is strong
evidence that the mechanism is actually at work. 
Recall that this particular step is trying to show
that the intervention made a contribution to the
outcomes, not that it was the sole cause. The
strength of the evidence for the impact pathway
in question would provide some basis on which to
assess if the intervention was a main ‘cause’ of
the outcomes. These later conclusions would be
strengthened by assessing the impact pathways
for other causal factors that had passed the hoop
test, which we address in the next section.
As the Bayes formula is widely used in science
and professional practice, as well as more or less
explicit forms of the hoop and smoking gun tests,
the above causal inference from intervention to
outcomes is thus justified on both scientific and
common sense grounds. 
2.2.2.2 Assessing the relevance of other factors (PT2)
In the previous stage, we have shown that I -> O,
but we still do not know if the intervention is the
only factor contributing to the improvements. If
we are interested in learning about the role of
other factors, we can follow a similar procedure
to build smoking gun evidence for the other
factors that have survived the hoop test, in our
case the closing down of the garment factory. We
might not necessarily be interested in this,
because if the other factors also had an impact,
this does not necessarily take anything away
from the relevance of our intervention, unless
they are independent from or unrelated to the
intervention (see PT3). In other words, unlike in
statistical linear models and in estimates of net
effects, confirmation that one factor has
contributed does not necessarily decrease the
chances of others having done the same: the
contribution of causal factors assessed with CA
or PT is not necessarily additive. 
However, even in such a case, assessing the
contribution of other factors is important for
learning why the intervention worked and for the
transferability of lessons learned (in other words,
to maximise the external validity of the
findings). Some of these factors might have
‘prepared the ground’, allowing a successful
performance of the intervention which would not
have happened had they not been there. 
Now let us assume that through smoking gun
tests we end up confirming causal mechanism
CMB about the garment factory. It turns out that
the closure did not visibly affect the amount of
time the girls spent assisting with household
chores, but at the same time, it gave girls a lot
more time to study. Girls spent the same time
helping other women in the house, but now did
not have to go to work in the afternoon and had
some more time available. Some of these girls
used their time to study, which – judging from
detailed accounts of how this time helped
performance – increased our confidence that the
factory closing contributed to the outcome. The
other identified causal factors would be explored
in a similar way.
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2.2.2.3 Testing the ToC as a whole (PT3)
It might be later discovered that not only the
closing of the garment factory contributed to the
outcome, but also that the additional available
study time was essential to make one specific
aspect of the training work. Indeed, among the
new activities implemented by the teachers after
having received the training, was an additional
module addressing the opportunities potentially
opened up by education, which aimed to help raise
awareness of the importance of school for girls.
This module was supposed to act as an incentive
for girls to devote their energies to school, raising
their awareness that performing well at school
could make a difference to their future life. But in
order to work (to affect outcomes), the additional
module needed additional time to be absorbed,
which was indeed available to most girls because
the garment factory had closed. That part of the
training would not have worked if the other causal
mechanism had not taken place: in this case the
outcome was produced by a combination or
package including the two.
At the same time, some of the factors discovered
to be relevant might not be directly needed for
the intervention to work like, for example, the
discovery of an awareness campaign on the
importance of girls’ education being rolled out in
the area, or the visit of a famous girls’ rights
activist which received considerable media
coverage. Rather than being directly ‘supporting’
to the intervention, we might realise that these
factors trigger relatively independent pathways,
more distantly connected to the training (the
‘external influences’ of Figure 2). The argument
would be that the teaching did not need the
campaign or the visit to improve, nor to improve
outcomes, and these factors might be shown to
have improved outcomes through their own
unique pathways. 
In brief, the point of the analysis in PT3 is to
analyse the connections among the relevant
factors and determine which ones act together,
forming a causal package (as in the intervention
+ assumptions + risks part of the ToC), and
which ones act more independently. While the
factors in the causal package trigger one single
outcome together, making teasing out which
factor contributed to what outcome a futile
exercise, the independent pathways trigger
outcomes that can be distinguished and thus
added up to each other. This means that if one of
these outcomes was discovered to be very
significant, our confidence in the impact of the
intervention would decrease (because, for
example, there was a religious reform that
changed cultural attitudes about girls going to
school, which was credited as the main
explanation). Conversely, if the effects from the
independent pathways are discovered to be weak,
our confidence that the ‘intervention +
supporting factors’ package is to be credited the
most would increase.
As we learn more about what causal mechanisms
did actually take place (in PT2) and about their
relation (or lack thereof) to each other (in PT3),
we gradually confirm and/or revise the ToC in
Figure 2 with the causal mechanisms that have
received empirical support; the conditions
(assumptions) that were needed in order for
those mechanisms to work according to the
evidence; the risks avoided; and with external
contributory factors that were unrelated
to/independent from the intervention but have
received empirical support. 
At this point the most difficult question can be
asked: ‘Was it the intervention mechanism with
the help of supporting factors, plus other
external independent factors, all represented in
the ToC, that best explains the outcome? Or
not?’. In symbols: 
Working assumption: ToC -> O; alternative
assumption: ~ToC -> O
Compared to PT1 and PT2, PT3 is more logical
than practical, and it does not require as much
data collection, but rather a synthesis of the
insights gained so far, and a comparison of the
knowledge acquired for the different factors and
causal mechanisms. The reason why we list it as
a separate PT step is that it has a doubly-decisive
value: if the working assumption is confirmed,
the alternative assumption is automatically
invalidated and the ToC is declared a clear winner.20
This happens because all plausible factors have
been tested and there simply are not any left. 
This final test is very demanding, and in practice
it will not always be possible to get to a point where
all plausible factors have been thoroughly tested
and a doubly-decisive test can be conducted. This
should not discourage potential evaluators as the
procedure does not require all PT steps to be
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necessarily undertaken: in many real-life
situations PT1 and part of PT2 will be carried
out, with a part of the possibly relevant causal
factors not thoroughly tested. This should in any
case lead to a modified ToC with stronger empirical
support than the initial one, and in which we
have higher confidence. We would not be able to
conclude that this ToC is the best explanation for
the outcomes, but we would be more confident
(or less confident, depending on the evidence)
that some of the factors tested (including the
intervention) contributed to the outcomes.
3 Concluding remarks: from ‘assessing impact’
to ‘assessing our confidence’ about impact
This article has shown that CA could be a useful
entry point to apply PT in impact evaluation and
that, at the same time, PT could strengthen
inferences made with CA, using tests and
principles largely used in science and
professional practice. Where CA says ‘verify
causal links’, PT indicates in more detail how to
go about verifying them. The article proposes a
combined CA-PT procedure made of the
traditional CA steps plus indications about how
to carry out steps five and six, which are more
specific than those currently offered by CA. The
procedure comprises three broad steps, each
including some PT tests. The intent was not to
describe in great detail how an evaluation of this
kind might be undertaken, but to show how the
logic of the two approaches can be combined in
the application to a single practical case. 
We have found a substantial overlap between the
conditions and steps of CA and PT. The proposed
procedure tests the intervention mechanism first
using hoop and smoking gun tests, and goes on to
use the same tests on other causal factors, some
of which are discovered to be essential for the
intervention to work, while others, although
affecting the outcome, are unrelated. When
enough evidence has been accumulated on the
relevant factors and causal mechanisms,
including how these are related and work in
combinations/packages, a final test can be
performed on a ‘heavy’ version of the ToC, the
confirmation of which halts the search for
additional explanations.
The almost seamless integration of the two
methodological approaches and the way they
strengthen each other, CA by making PT more
evaluative and PT by relating CA to an
established methodological approach, proves
that their combined use holds promise in
exploring and testing alternatives to
counterfactual causal inference in impact
evaluations of development interventions.
In particular, the proposed procedure does not
‘measure impact’ but rather assesses our
confidence about impact; and the strength of the
evidence collected is measured, in accordance
with the Bayes formula, on its ability to change
our prior, pre-data collection confidence that the
intervention actually had an impact.
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Notes
1 We define ‘causal factors’ as factors that
might influence/contribute to the outcomes.
2 In the causation literature this is called an
INUS (Insufficient but Necessary component
of an Unnecessary but Sufficient package)
cause (Mackie 1974). 
3 ‘Within-case analysis’ refers to studies of one
case, where the case study is defined as a
single entity as opposed to case-based studies
which can compare multiple cases, or studies
observing phenomena over a large population
of statistical units.
4 This means that the simultaneous presence of
all the connected parts is essential to identify
the causal mechanism. If one part is lost, the
causal mechanism is not the same and needs
to be redefined. 
5 CPOs are not the only type of data useful in
PT; it is possible to distinguish among at least
four types of evidence: sequence, pattern,
account and trace (Beach and Pedersen 
2012).
6 The logic used to assess the strength of
evidence in process tracing is inspired by the
Bayesian approach to probability, instead of
frequentist probability which informs
traditional statistical evidence.
7 One difference with a statistical approach is
that, if we relied only on sample size, we
would not estimate probabilities of specific
individuals or groups giving a positive
judgement and then compare these
probabilities to the judgement actually given,
even in small samples, but simply calculate
the average judgement about the project from
a large random sample of stakeholders.
8 ‘E’ normally stands for ‘evidence’; however,
since we are referring to observations in a
broad sense, and observations are not
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necessarily evidence, we will take ‘E’ to refer
to the more humble concept of ‘observation’.
9 The sensitivity of the evidence P(E|M) (also
known as the ability to minimise Type II error
or false negatives) is high. This is because our
post-observation confidence in the theory
P(T|E) is obtained as P(T) (our pre-
observation confidence) multiplied by a factor,
and is thus increased if the factor is >1, while
it is decreased if the factor is <1. The factor is
a ratio of probabilities, and will thus be >1 if
the denominator is smaller than the
numerator, and <1 if the denominator is
greater than the numerator. It follows that our
confidence in the theory is strengthened by the
evidence if P(E|T) is greater than P(E). In
particular, the greater P(E|T) and the smaller
P(E), the more our confidence is strengthened.
10 This is intuitive when we think of how we draw
inferences in everyday life. We do not start
suspecting that ‘something is the case’ until
we observe (perhaps repeatedly) something we
do not observe under ‘normal’ circumstances,
something which is more probable ‘under the
case’ than on average. For example, if you are
in a shop and hear the door open you do not
suspect that someone you share a house with is
opening the door. It is true that, if your
partner wanted to open the shop’s door, you
would hear the door open [P(E|it is  your
partner) is close to one], but you hear the door
open very often while you are in the shop so
P(E), the general probability that the door
opens while you are inside, is also close to one.
Conversely, if you hear your house’s door open,
the likelihood of it being your partner
(represented as [P(it is your partner|E)] is
much higher because, while it is as true as in
the shop that they would be able to open the
door if they wanted to [P(E|it is your partner)
is the same], your house door opens a lot more
rarely than the shop’s, because you need a key
to open it and only very few people have it
[P(E) is much lower].
11 P(CM|E) = P(CM)/[P(CM) +
P(~CM)*P(E|~CM)/P(E|CM)].
12 This is also intuitive: back to the previous
example, suppose that P is your partner
wanting to open the door, while ~P is any other
person wanting the same. When you are in the
shop and hear the door open, it could be many
people in addition to her/him. If she wanted,
she could open the door because no key is
needed [P(E|P) is close to one] but anybody
else who wishes could do the same[P(E|~P) is
also close to one]. At home, however, the
probability of the door opening when someone
other than your partner wants to come in
[P(E|~P)] is close to zero, perhaps because
s/he is the only one with the required key. So
when you hear the door open at home, you have
practical certainty of who is coming in, unless
other household members also have keys. This
is because, as the Bayes formula predicts,
P(E|it is your partner) is high while P(E|it is
not your partner) is low. Now suppose that
other household members also have keys, so
that when you hear the door open, in principle
it could be any of them. Normally, in such
cases, you still have stronger suspicions in
relation to some household members than
others, because you are usually aware of their
plans. The plans could have changed, but
usually they do not so if you are expecting one
member at a certain hour while you know that
other members are miles away from the house,
when you hear the door open, you know who it
is: the prior probability that it is the one you
were expecting is very high. This probability is
increased when people show up exactly when
they said they would show up: while there is
always a small probability that it could be
someone else, this probability gets infinitely
smaller that someone else shows up at exactly
that time, and so on. This is why sometimes
when we expect a phone call at a specific
moment (e.g. a few seconds from now) we
answer the phone talking directly to the person
we are expecting to talk to, instead of saying
‘hello’ in the normal way, when we do not know
who we are speaking with: the chances of
receiving a call in the space of a few seconds
are normally close to zero (although of course
they increase as the time frame increases: the
chances of receiving a call in a day are much
higher, they get close to one in a week, etc.). 
One statistical equivalent procedure to
obtain the above predictions about who is
opening the door is to observe the same event
(the door opening) as many times as possible
and eventually calculate the number of times
it was your partner or someone else, using
that probability to predict who it will be next
time. What is missing in this procedure is that
contextual information is not taken into
account. For example, even if 95 per cent of
the times the house door opens it is your
partner, next time it might not necessarily be
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her/him if you have just learned that s/he lost
the keys. The prior probability of the event
[P(E|it is your partner)], which is missing
from traditional statistical methods based on
frequentist probability, becomes suddenly very
low, and with it the posterior probability, too
[P(it is your partner|E)].
13 One type of straw-in-the-wind test is the
judgement about an intervention provided by
a stakeholder who has stakes/interests in
providing a positive judgement. If s/he indeed
provides positive judgement, this is what we
expected and does not really change our prior
confidence in the theory.
14 Returning to the opening door example: what
evidence do we look for in order to guess who
opened the door? First of all, if the door
requires a key to open, anyone who does not
have access to that key fails the hoop test. The
solid theory in this case is that in order to
open the door you must have the key: it is a
necessary condition. The smoking gun in this
case might be hearing the person coming in,
taking his shoes off, and dropping the shoes in
what appears to be the same place that your
partner drops theirs in: you might not actually
see it, but hear the same sounds that you
always hear when this happens. What is the
chance that these sounds have been produced
by someone other than your partner entering
the house? Very low, practically zero. You
deduce that this evidence is extremely
unlikely to have been produced had your
partner not just come in, and you safely
believe that this is exactly what has happened,
long before seeing it with your eyes.
15 Factor F is a specific factor or mechanism that
seems plausible to the evaluator and has
passed the hoop test.
16 There is an earlier step, which we might call
P0, where we build our prior confidence on the
causal mechanism on the basis of existing
knowledge and literature, which is not a
proper test in the sense defined here and
therefore is not addressed in detail.
17 These might be both supporting factors (i.e.
factors that are necessary for the intervention
to work) and also more independent, external
factors.
18 The CA steps up to and including step four are
not completely unrelated to PT. They are useful
to estimate the prior probability of the ToC
holding, which we do not address in detail here.
19 More specific questions can be added, making
confirmation of the mechanism stronger.
20 The more alternatives are tested, the higher
the chances that the remaining theory built
through combining all the surviving factors
will be strong enough to pass the doubly-
decisive test.
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